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We examine how diversi￿cation of projects assigned to an agency
can enhance e¢ ciency by informing a principal of the agency￿ s qual-
ity. Projects that appear ine¢ cient in isolation may be justi￿ed when
assigned to the same agency. Assigning di⁄erent tasks to di⁄erent
special purpose governments, though allowing for technical e¢ ciency
in the management of each project, may nevertheless reduce overall
e¢ ciency.
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11 Introduction
A government agency is often assigned multiple tasks. For example, a De-
partment of Transportation may be responsible for building roads, regulating
airlines, subsidizing mass transit, and so on. Such multiple assignments may
appear obvious, but which tasks are assigned which agency is not trivial. For
example, should a new police station be designed by the police department,
or by the ￿re department which had recently built ￿re stations, or by the city
planning department, or by a private architect? Should labor negotiations
with teachers be conducted by the school superintendent, the city attorney,
or the director of personnel?
The problem we address may be especially relevant for special district
governments. In the year 2002, the United States had 35,052 special dis-
trict governments with total revenue of over $123 billion. Of these districts,
91 percent performed a single function (see US Census 2005 and Stephens
and Ross 1998). Such specialization may lead to technical e¢ ciency and to
accountability. But, we argue, such specialization can make it di¢ cult to
evaluate the quality of an agency￿ s management, and therefore lead to poor
decisions of what projects an agency should adopt. Less specialization can
reduce technical e¢ ciency, but can increase overall e¢ ciency. Put di⁄erently,
special districts limit the bene￿ts of economies of scope which can arise not
only when an agency produces multiple outputs, but also when an agency
produces a single output with di⁄erent technologies.
This paper asks which tasks or projects should be assigned to which agen-
cies or special purpose governments, and in particular how the diversi￿cation
(as opposed to the specialization) of tasks assigned to an agency a⁄ects de-
cisions of what projects to pursue.
Some disadvantages of multiple responsibilities are well known. Knowl-
edge gained by experience calls for specialization. Assigning multiple mis-
sions to one agency can reduce both accountability and e⁄ort (Dewatripont,
Jewitt, and Tirole 1999). An advantage of assigning di⁄erent tasks to one
agency is that the agency may have expertise in the necessary areas. In
particular, Weisbach and Nussim (2004) consider the decision to combine
tax and spending programs. They argue, for example, that welfare programs
and tax programs both rely on income or wealth measurement, and that both
need large-scale information and ￿nancial processing, so that it makes sense
to put them in the same agency. The advantage of specialization may be
countered, however, by problems of coordination across agencies.
2We propose a di⁄erent explanation. Consider a principal (say the vot-
ers, city council, or a mayor) who must decide whether to approve a project
proposed by a governmental agency. The proposed project may be more
attractive the more competent the agency or o¢ cial in charge, but the prin-
cipal is unsure about the agency￿ s competence. Suppose the principal can
evaluate the quality of one type of project (called M, for Monitored), but
not of another type (called N, for Not monitored), and that the agency￿ s
competence across the two areas is positively correlated. Then the principal
may approve project N only if the agency performed well on project M. This
diversi￿cation allows the principal to estimate more accurately the quality of
project N than when N is proposed alone.1
The principal￿ s uncertainty can extend beyond the agency￿ s competence.
The uncertainty can also relate to the agency￿ s preferences or ideology. For
example, is the agency su¢ ciently concerned about environmental damage,
or about the welfare of the poor, or about creating jobs? A principal who
observed the agency￿ s preferences when it designed or implemented project
M can then learn about its likely preferences were it to design or implement
project N. The principal would then authorize project N only if he had
su¢ cient con￿dence that the agency will pursue the principal￿ s goals.
The critical idea in our analysis is that an agency￿ s performance on one
project can inform a principal about its expected performance on another
project. For simplicity, and to highlight the e⁄ects, we mostly assume that
the agency￿ s performance on one project can be observed; call this the M
project. But its performance on another project is observed only long after
the project is completed; call this project N.
The assignment of projects to an agency may be more important for local
agencies than for national agencies. A national agency can undertake similar
projects sequentially, in di⁄erent locations. For example, it may ￿rst build
a bridge on an interstate highway in Iowa. If that bridge is successful, it
can then expand the bridge-building program to other states. The public
can predict an agency￿ s competence on a project by looking at its success
on previous projects. In contrast, a city government is unlikely to have an
opportunity to build many bridges￿ one cannot look at its competence in
bridge building by looking at previous success in building other bridges. The
1Of course, if performance on the two projects is uncorrelated, whereas performance
over time on the same type of project is correlated, then specialization is more attrac-
tive. We do not deny such consideration, but focus on the more interesting case where
diversi￿cation is optimal, and may justify some ine¢ cient projects.
3alternative is to bundle di⁄erent projects, as we model.
Local and national governments show an additional di⁄erence. Exper-
tise may be jurisdiction speci￿c: conditions in di⁄erent jurisdictions may
di⁄er, or for Tiebout reasons the preferences in di⁄erent regions may di⁄er.
Furthermore, o¢ cials in local governments may show high mobility across
jurisdictions, while mobility of o¢ cials in a national agency may be slower.
Then for a local mayor to ￿nd out if an agency head is competent, or for
voters to ￿nd out if the o¢ cial well matches their needs, they must observe
performance on a recent project, rather than rely on a long history of past
performance.
Section 2 surveys literature on monitoring. Section 3 presents a model
which examines the informational advantages of bundling the two projects.
Section 4 generalizes the model to the bundling of four projects, where the ob-
servation of two diversi￿ed projects helps to choose among two new projects.
Section 5 concludes and suggests extensions.
2 Literature
In the study of ￿rms, bundling of projects relates to the span of control given
to a manager. Filson (2000) considers removal of managers found to be of
low quality, and how much resources to allocate to managers of di⁄erent
estimated quality. Our model di⁄ers from his in two main ways. First, we
let an increased span of control improve the information about an agency￿ s
quality. Second, whereas he focuses on retention or replacement of managers,
we consider which projects to adopt.
Several papers study how the internal organization of ￿rms can a⁄ect
information about the ability of agents. Berkovitch, Israel, and Tolkowsky
(1999) study when economic units should be structured as stand-alone ￿rms
versus an integrated ￿rm (conglomerate): an integrated ￿rm better con-
trols agency problems through yardstick competition between managers for
project acceptance, but reduces the ability to receive division-speci￿c project
information from the market. On yardstick competition (how performance
by one agent reveals information about the ability of another agent), see
Besley and Case (1995). Related arguments about how the success of policy
reveals information about an agent￿ s competence are found in Rogo⁄ and
Sibert (1988), Rogo⁄ (1990), and Glazer and Hassin (1988). Competitions
among local jurisdictions for receipt of federal grants can reveal information
4about the ability of local politicians (see Boarnet and Glazer (2002) for evi-
dence relating to the ￿ ypaper e⁄ect). And, of course, our approach relates to
signaling, in which an agent engages in a costly action to reveal his ability.
For example, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) show how politicians who
compete for o¢ ce may exert e⁄ort on innovation with the aim of signaling
ability to the electorate.
A ￿rm may assign tasks to di⁄erent types of workers with the aim of
learning about their abilities. Meyers (1994) considers the problem when
production requires the participation of a senior worker and a junior worker.
If each of the two juniors divides his time equally between the two projects,
then the project outcomes are very informative about which senior is more
able, because the total contributions of the juniors to the two projects are
perfectly correlated. On the other hand, the project outcomes provide no
information about which junior is abler. If, instead, each junior works ex-
clusively on one project, then project outcomes provide more information
about the relative abilities of juniors and less information about the relative
abilities of seniors.
Diversi￿cation of tasks can also a⁄ect incentives. Dewatripont et al.
(1999) use a career-concern model to study the performance of government
agencies. They ￿nd that assigning more tasks to one o¢ cial typically weakens
the link between his performance and his talent, and so reduces the agent￿ s
e⁄ort. The e⁄ort will be especially reduced if the agency￿ s mission (the ob-
jective the agency gives itself) becomes fuzzy. The major problem is that a
government o¢ cial has di¢ culty revealing his talent when he must perform
several tasks. The poorer revelation may even lead a high-ability agent to
refuse some tasks.2
3 Project assignment to gather information
We turn next to our explanation, which considers a principal who can es-
timate the agency￿ s expected performance on a project by evaluating its
performance on a di⁄erent project.
2The idea that an agent￿ s incentives are weaker when he incompletely controls asset
allocation decisions builds on work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995), and Aghion
and Tirole (1997).
53.1 Assumptions
Nature determines whether the agency has high quality (is good) or low
quality (is bad). The prior probability that the agency is good is ￿. The
probability a good agency performs well on any project is ￿G; the probability
a bad agency performs well is ￿B < ￿G. One interpretation is that output of
an agency of type i is Qi = f(aiL), where L is the amount of labor used, and
aG > aB. In the next section we extend this to multiple inputs, and have
the decision be not only whether to adopt a project, but instead whether to
adopt a capital-intensive project or instead a labor-intensive project.
Projects come in two areas, M and N. The principal (for example, the
public, or a mayor) can immediately evaluate performance of an M project,
but can evaluate performance on an N project only after a long lag.
Let SG be the principal￿ s observation that project M succeeded (or that
the principal observed a good signal). Then, following SG, the posterior






￿G￿ + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿)
: (1)
Thus the probability that project N will succeed given that project M
was seen to succeed is the probability that the agency was revealed good
times ￿G, plus the probability that the agency was revealed bad multiplied
by ￿B:
￿G￿





￿G￿ + ￿B(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿B: (2)
In contrast, if project N is adopted with no prior observation of the
agency￿ s quality, the probability that the agency will perform well on N is
￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B: (3)
The timeline with diversi￿cation of projects in the same agency is as
follows
1. The agency adopts project M.
2. The public observes the outcome of project M and updates its belief
about the agency￿ s quality.
3. The public decides whether to adopt project N.
64. The outcome of project N is realized.
The timeline with specialization on project N is
1. The public decides whether to adopt project N.
2. The public decides whether to adopt an additional project N.
3. The outcomes of the projects are realized.
3.2 Assigning tasks to agencies
We assess the bene￿ts of assigning two di⁄erent types of projects to the same
agency by comparing the expected bene￿ts of the specialized and the diver-
si￿ed strategies. The specialized strategy means that the principal adopts N
projects without knowing the agency￿ s quality. Let the bene￿t from project
M when it is good be MG, and let its bene￿t be MB when the project is bad.
De￿ne NG and NB similarly. Note that MB or MG may be negative.
We start by computing the expected bene￿t of the specialized strategy,
which is the simple sum of the expected bene￿ts:
max[(￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B)NG;0]: (4)
To determine the expected bene￿t of the diversi￿ed strategy we must
determine the bene￿t of project N, knowing whether M was good or bad.
With probability ￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B project M is observed to be good. The
bene￿t of diversi￿cation consists then of the following terms: (a) the expected
bene￿t of project M; (b) the expected bene￿t of N knowing that M was good;
(c) the expected bene￿t of N knowing that M was bad. Obviously, if project
N has a net negative bene￿t given that project M was bad, it should not
be undertaken. Similarly, if the expected bene￿t of the combined project
is negative it is better to do nothing. Thus, expected bene￿ts under the
diversi￿ed strategy are
max[￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B)MG + (1 ￿ (￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B))MB+(￿￿G + (1 ￿ ￿)￿B)
(5) ￿
￿G￿
￿G￿+￿B(1￿￿)(￿GNG + (1 ￿ ￿G)NB) + maxf(1 ￿
￿G￿




To gain insight into the bene￿ts of diversi￿cation, we make simplifying as-
sumptions. Normalize MG = NG = 1 and let a bad project be the exact
opposite of a good project, or let MB = NB = ￿1. Let the probability that
a bad agency will perform well be zero (￿B = 0). Suppose for the moment
that project M has, in isolation, positive expected bene￿ts. As it is now any-
way worthwhile to undertake project M, the net bene￿t of diversi￿cation,
￿, equals the di⁄erence between expressions (5) and (4):
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿￿G(1 ￿ 2￿G); (6)
with @￿
@￿ = ￿G(2￿G ￿ 1) and @￿
@￿G = ￿(4￿G ￿ 1).
Our simplifying assumptions require that ￿ ￿ 1=2. For ￿ near that
value, diversi￿cation is de￿nitely worthwhile: in the absence of diversi￿ca-
tion, project N would always be adopted, but would often fail; diversi￿cation
allows project N to be adopted only when it will likely succeed. When ￿G = 1
(a good agency always adopts a good project), the outcome of project M per-
fectly predicts the agency￿ s quality, and so again diversi￿cation is worthwhile.
Note that diversi￿cation can be e¢ cient even when project M and project
N considered in isolation each has negative expected bene￿ts. Consider ￿rst
the case where the informative project M has a negative expected bene￿t ￿.
Then to know whether diversi￿cation is worthwhile, we need to add this cost
to our net bene￿t of diversi￿cation ￿ as given by (6). What matters is then
both the cost ￿ and the value of ￿; this value depends on ￿ and on ￿G; the
smaller is ￿ and the higher is ￿G the more informative project M will be,
and the greater the gains from diversi￿cation.
Consider next a project N that in isolation has a negative expected ben-
e￿t. The expected bene￿t from diversi￿cation now becomes
￿N = ￿￿G (2￿G ￿ 1) ￿ ￿: (7)
A necessary condition for this expression to be positive is that ￿G > 1=2:
only when the information from project M on the agency￿ s quality has a high
probability of generating a good N project is the information valuable. The
net bene￿t of project N in isolation ((2￿￿G ￿ 1)) is negative; if ￿G is near
1=2, then ￿ must be su¢ ciently small to make diversi￿cation worthwhile.
Precisely when ￿ is small do we expect the information revealed by project
M to be worthwhile.
8Our argument suggests limits to agency specialization: an agency should
be assigned that bundle of responsibilities so that the principal can use per-
formance on projects he can evaluate to predict performance on projects
which are harder to evaluate.
4 Information from multiple projects
We so far considered agency quality as one-dimensional￿ it is either good or
bad, and we supposed that one project is informative about quality whereas
the other is not. But our approach can apply more generally, with similar
qualitative results.
Consider a uni￿ed school district, which runs both elementary and high
schools. Parents with children in elementary school can well observe the
inter-personal qualities of the teachers, for example how well they can con-
trol a noisy child, or how well they can comfort a child. But since the
material taught is simple, parents may not know how well the elementary
school teacher masters the subject taught. In contrast, in high school the
material taught is more advanced, and the mastery of the material taught is
measured by standardized tests such as Advanced Placement tests or College
Board subject tests. Thus, parents may be able to measure the knowledge of
teachers in high school. Di⁄erent activities yield di⁄erent information about
the agency￿ s ability.
For another example, consider a transit agency which may operate buses
and trains. Trains are very sensitive to the state of capital (either its mainte-
nance or its original design)￿ a small defect with an undercarriage can stop
all trains. Thus, the public may well estimate the quality with which cap-
ital is managed by observing the performance of trains. In contrast, buses
are more forgiving in terms of capital (one broken bus does not shut down
the whole route), but the public can better observe the quality of the labor,
say of the bus drivers, since the public directly observes them. Thus, we can
think that trains provide good information about the management of capital,
whereas buses provide good information about the management of labor.
In both examples, di⁄erent activities reveal performance on di⁄erent
tasks, helping the principal select projects. The following modi￿cation of
the previous model explores that. In contrast to the earlier model, now we
suppose that an agency￿ s ability involves two dimensions (ability in managing
capital and ability in managing labor) rather than only one (general ability).
94.1 Assumptions
Suppose that management of capital can be good, yielding e⁄ective capital
input of KG, or management of capital can be bad, yielding e⁄ective capital
input of KB, with KG > KB: Similar notation applies to management of
labor, which can be LG or LB. For simplicity, let the prior probability that
an agency can manage a given input well be 1=2. Let the production function
be Cobb-Douglas, with output for rail being KrL1￿r. Output for bus service
is KbL1￿b. The costs of the projects are ￿xed and identical for the two
projects. Suppose that r > 1=2, that 1 ￿ b > 1=2, and that the value of r
is su¢ ciently close to the value of 1 ￿ b so that, ceteris paribus, if capital
is managed well the rail project should be adopted, and if labor is managed
well the bus project should be adopted.
We shall compare two regimes or institutions. The ￿rst regime, with spe-
cial district governments, is specialized: one agency (the bus agency) operates
buses, and the other agency (the rail agency) operates trains. The second
regime we consider, the diversi￿ed regime, has a single agency operate both
bus and rail service. Alternatively, we can ask whether agencies should be
geographically based or functionally determined. A geographic assignment
across two cities would have one agency in each city, with each agency oper-
ating both bus and rail service. A functional assignment (corresponding to
special district governments) would have one agency run buses in both cities,
and one agency run trains in both cities.
The timeline of the game is as follows:
￿ The principal determines whether to have two specialized agencies (one
for rail and one for buses) or to have a diversi￿ed agency.
￿ Nature determines the agency￿ s ability in managing capital and in man-
aging labor
￿ The principal can observe an agency￿ s ability in managing capital by
observing its performance on rail, and can observe the agency￿ s ability
in managing labor by observing its performance on rail.
￿ The principal decides whether to adopt a rail project or a bus project.
He assigns a project to the same agency which had operated that type
of project in the past.
104.2 Specialized agencies
We shall consider outcomes under each regime in sequence. Under the spe-
cialized regime, the principal observes the value of K for the rail agency,
and the value of L for the bus agency. Under our assumptions, if the ob-
served values are KG and LB, then in period 2 the principal should adopt
the rail project, assigning it to the rail agency. If the observed values are
KB and LG, then in period 2 the principal should adopt the bus project,
assigning it to the bus agency. If the observed values are KB and LB, or if
the observed values are KG and LG, then the principal is indi⁄erent between
the two projects. Note however, that because the agencies have di⁄erent
responsibilities, an observation of, say, KG is consistent with the rail agency
having either low or high productivity in managing labor; the principal does
not know which. That is, when the principal observes KG in the rail agency,
he does not know whether that agency has a value of LG or instead of LB;
and when he observes LG in the bus agency, he does not know whether that
agency has a value of KG or instead of KB. Because of his ignorance, the
principal may therefore make the mistake of assigning a rail project in period
2 when the rail agency manages capital well and labor poorly, while the bus
agency would manage both capital and labor well.3
4.3 Diversi￿ed agency
Consider next a diversi￿ed agency, which manages both a rail project and
a bus project in period 1. Because of this diversi￿cation, the prinicipal gets
perfect information on the agency￿ s ability in managing both capital and
labor. If the principal knows that the agency manages capital well and labor
poorly, it will adopt the rail project in period 2; if the principal knows that the
agency manages labor well and capital poorly, it will adopt the bus project
in period 2. And if the principal knows that the agency manages one input
well and one poorly, then he is indi⁄erent about the assignment. Notice that
the diversi￿cation of projects within the agency means that the principal has
perfect information about its ability, and so, in contrast to possible outcomes
3This simple setup has an additional implication. When the principal behaves optimally
in assigning projects in period 2, a rail project will be assigned to the rail agency because
the principal knows that it manages capital well, but does not know whether the bus
agency manages capital well or not. Put di⁄erently, we will observe consistency over time
in which projects are assigned to which agencies.
11with specialized agencies, that the principal never adopts the wrong project.
Indeed, even if it is more costly to run a diversi￿ed agency than to run
specialized agencies, the informational bene￿ts arising from diversi￿cation
can justify diversi￿cation over specialization.
5 Conclusion
This paper o⁄ered an explanation for when and how to diversify projects
in government agencies. To keep the diversi￿cation option open, govern-
ment may refrain from privatizing some projects. The public agency may be
less e¢ cient on these projects, but they are a good monitor for the overall
capability of the agency.
We claim that diversifying projects in one agency can have clear infor-
mational advantages for the principal. A few caveats are in order. First
adding more projects to the same agency makes it more di¢ cult to monitor
the overall performance of the agency, as explained by Dewatripont et al.
(1999). Second we assume that the agency does not play strategically: it
correctly reports the outcome of the projects it manages and does not ma-
nipulate its proposals for new projects. Agencies that know they are good in
certain easily monitored projects may propose those new uncertain projects
that they favor but that are not necessarily optimal for the policy maker.
Third, if learning by doing is important, then specialization can lead to im-
proved performance.
Our approach can apply not only to di⁄erent tasks, but also to the size
of a jurisdiction. Consider public schools. Suppose the middle class can well
monitor performance, but that the poor cannot. Then it may be best to have
a school district encompass both middle class and poor areas of the city. If
the middle class ￿nds that the school board is incompetent or corrupt, then
the school board is probably also bad for the schools in the poor area.
This e⁄ect may lead to an argument against charter schools. A school
which becomes a charter school may improve its performance. But perfor-
mance in the system as a whole may deteriorate. Also note that the poor
may agree to larger spending in the middle-class schools, or even to subsidize
the middle-class schools, if they could thereby get the informational bene￿ts
from locating in the same school district.
Lastly, the model can be extended to consider a variety of voters rather
than a variety of projects: voters may bene￿t from having voters of a dif-
12ferent type in the same jurisdiction, when di⁄erent types of voters are able
to recognize di⁄erent aspects of performance, say some recognizing e¢ ciency
in the use of labor, with others recognizing e¢ ciency in the use of capital.
Or di⁄erent residents may use di⁄erent services, with some shedding light on
the government￿ s e¢ ciency in the use of capital, and the other on the use
of labor. Such a bene￿t from diverse perspectives would go counter to the
Tiebout prediction of homogeneous jurisdictions.
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156 Notation
aK Measure of productivity on capital-intensive project
bL Measure of productivity on labor-intensive project
MB Bene￿t of project M if the agency is bad
MG Bene￿t of project M if the agency is good
NB Bene￿t of project N if the agency is bad
NG Bene￿t of project N if the agency is good
PK Capital-intensive project in period 2
PL Labor-intensive project in period 2
QK Project which reveals agency￿ s e¢ ciency in managing capital
QL Project which reveals agency￿ s e¢ ciency in managing labor
￿ Principal￿ s bene￿t from diversi￿cation compared to specialization
￿K Agency￿ s e¢ ciency in managing capital
￿L Agency￿ s e¢ ciency in managing labor
￿ Prior probability that agency is good
￿B Probability a bad agency will perform well
￿G Probability a good agency will perform well
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